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ABSTRACT
Advertisers are increasingly turning to fingerprinting techniques
to track users across the web. As web browsing activity shifts to
mobile platforms, traditional browser fingerprinting techniques be-
come less effective; however, device fingerprinting using built-in
sensors offers a new avenue for attack. We study the feasibility of
using motion sensors to perform device fingerprinting at scale, and
explore countermeasures that can be used to protect privacy.
We perform a large-scale user study to demonstrate that motion
sensor fingerprinting is effective with 500 users. We also develop a
model to estimate prediction accuracy for larger user populations;
our model provides a conservative estimate of at least 12% classifi-
cation accuracy with 100 000 users. We then investigate the use of
motion sensors on the web and find, distressingly, that many sites
send motion sensor data to servers for storage and analysis, paving
the way to potential fingerprinting. Finally, we consider the prob-
lem of developing fingerprinting countermeasures; we evaluate a
previously proposed obfuscation technique and a newly developed
quantization technique via a user study. We find that both tech-
niques are able to drastically reduce fingerprinting accuracy with-
out significantly impacting the utility of the sensors in web appli-
cations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We are in the middle of a war over user privacy on the web. After
the failure of the “Do Not Track” proposal, users have increasingly
started using tools such as ad- and tracker-blocking extensions, as
well as private browsing modes, to protect their privacy. In turn,
advertisers have started using browser fingerprinting [20, 32, 43] to
track users across the web without the use of cookies. As the bat-
tleground shifts to mobile platforms, which are quickly becoming
the dominant mode for web browsing [1, 10, 14, 18], existing fin-
gerprinting techniques become less effective [35, 51]; at the same
time, new threats emerge: mobile browsers give web pages access
to internal motion sensors (accelerometers and gyroscopes) and re-
searchers have showed that imperfections in these sensors can be
used to fingerprint devices [29, 31, 35], boosting the accuracy of a
weakened browser fingerprint.
An important question not addressed by prior work is whether
such fingerprinting can be effective at scale, as state-of-the-art tech-
niques [29] have only been evaluated on a set of 100 devices. We
first perform a larger-scale evaluation of the methods, collecting
motion sensor data from a total of 610 devices, and showing that
high accuracy classification is still feasible. We then used the data
we collected to develop a model to predict classification accuracy
for larger data sets, by fitting a parametric distribution to model
inter- and intra-cluster distances. We can then use these distri-
butions to predict the accuracy of a k-NN classifier, used with
state-of-the-art distance metric learning techniques; our evaluation
shows that even with 100 000 devices, 12–16% accuracy can be
achieved, depending on training set size, which suggests that mo-
tion sensor fingerprinting can be effective when combined with
even a weak browser fingerprint. Note that because k-NN under-
performs other classifiers, such as bagged trees, our estimate of
accuracy is quite conservative.
A second question we wanted to answer was, how are motion
sensors used on the web? We analyzed the static and dynamic
JavaScripts used by the Alexa top-100K websites [5] and identi-
fied over 1 000 instances of motion sensor access. After cluster-
ing, we were able to identify a number of common uses of motion
sensors, including orientation detection and random number gener-
ation. More distressingly, we noted that a large fraction of scripts
send motion data back to a server, while others use the presence of
motion sensors in advertising decisions. Thus, although we have
not been able to identify cases of motion sensor fingerprinting in
the wild, the infrastructure for collecting and analyzing this data is
already there in some cases.
These results suggest that motion sensor fingerprinting is a real-
istic privacy threat. We therefore wanted to understand the feasi-
bility of defending against fingerprinting through browser- or OS-
based techniques. Although several defenses have been proposed
to mitigate motion sensor fingerprinting, they reduce the potential
utility of the sensor data by adding noise or other transforms. We
wanted to understand how this trade off between privacy and utility
plays out for the likely uses of the device motion API. To do this,
we implement a game that uses motion sensors for controls—a rel-
atively demanding application. We then carry out a user study to
investigate the impact of privacy protections on the game difficulty.
We evaluate an obfuscation method proposed by Das et al. [29] and
develop a new quantization-based protection method. Encourag-
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ingly, we find that neither method creates a statistically significant
impact on motion sensor utility, as measured by both subjective
and objective measures. This suggests that user privacy may be
preserved without sacrificing much utility.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We evaluate the state-of-the-art fingerprinting techniques by
Das et al. [29] on a large data set of 610 devices. (§4.1)
• We develop a model for predicting how the k-NN classifier
will perform on larger data sets and use it to obtain a conser-
vative estimate of fingerprinting accuracy for up to 100 000
devices. (§4.2)
• We perform a measurement study to evaluate how motion
sensor information is used by existing websites. We identify
several common uses for motion sensor data and find that
motion data is frequently sent to servers. (§5)
• We develop a new fingerprinting countermeasure that uses
quantization of data in polar coordinates. (§6.1)
• We carry out a user study to evaluate the impact of our coun-
termeasure, as well as the obfuscation technique proposed by
Das et al. [29], on the utility of motion sensors and find that
users experience no significant ill effects from the counter-
measures. (§6.3)
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We present background information and related work in Section
2. In Section 3, we briefly describe our data collection and fea-
ture extraction process along with the classification algorithms and
metrics used in our evaluation. Section 4, describes how we ex-
trapolate fingerprinting accuracy at large scale by deriving intra-
and inter-class distance distributions. We present our measurement
study on how top websites access motion sensors in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 evaluates the usability impact of fingerprinting countermea-
sures through a large-scale online user study. Finally, we conclude
in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Fingerprinting devices has been an interesting research area for
many decades. It all started with a rich body of research that looked
at fingerprinting wireless devices by analyzing the spectral char-
acteristics of wireless transmitters [40, 47, 48]. Researchers then
moved onto fingerprinting computers by exploiting their clock skew
rate [42]. Later on, as computers got connected to the Internet, re-
searcher were able to exploit such skew rates to distinguish con-
nected devices through TCP and ICMP timestamps [36]. Installed
software has also been used to track devices, as different devices
usually have a different software base installed. Researchers have
utilized such strategy to uniquely distinguish subtle differences in
the firmwares and device drivers [33]. Moreover, there are open
source toolkits like Nmap [41] and Xprobe [54] that can finger-
print the underlying operating system remotely by analyzing the
responses from the TCP/IP stack. The latest trend in fingerprinting
devices is through the web browser. We will now describe some of
the most recent and well-known results in this field.
Browser Fingerprinting.
The primary application of browser fingerprinting is to uniquely
track a user across multiple websites for advertisement purpose.
Traditionally this has been done through the injection of cookies.
However, privacy concerns have pushed browser developers to pro-
vide ways to clear cookies, and also provide options to browse in
private mode which does not store long-term cookies. This has
forced publishers to come up with new ways to uniquely iden-
tify and track users. The Panopticlick project was one of the first
works that looked into exploiting easily accessible browser proper-
ties such as installed fonts and plug-ins to fingerprint browsers [32].
In recent years, researchers have come up with a more advanced
technique that uses HTML5 canvas elements to fingerprint the fonts
and rendering engines used by the browser [43]. Moreover, users
can be profiled and tracked by their browsing history [46]. Many
studies have shown that all of these techniques are actually used in
the wild [20, 21, 44]. Researchers have also looked at countermea-
sures that typically disable or limit the ability of a web publisher
to probe particular browser characteristics. Privaricator [45] is one
such approach that adds noise to the fingerprint to break linkability
across multiple visits.
With the rapid growth of smart devices, researchers are now fo-
cusing on adopting existing fingerprinting techniques in the con-
text of smart devices. Like cookies, app developers have looked
at using device IDs such as Unique Device Identifier (UDID) or
International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) to track
users across multiple applications. However, Apple ceased the use
of UDID since iOS 6 [4] and for Andriod accessing IMEI requires
explicit user permission [3]. Moreover, due to constrained hard-
ware and software environment existing methods often lack in pre-
cision for smartphones and recent studies have shown this to be
true [35, 51]. However, this year Laperdrix et al. have shown that
it is in fact possible to fingerprint smartphones effectively through
user-agent string which is becoming richer every day due to the
numerous vendors with their different firmware versions [39]. Oth-
ers have looked at fingerprinting smartphones by exploiting the
personal configuration settings which are often accessible to third
party apps [38].
Sensor Fingerprinting.
Today’s smartphones come with a wide range of sensors, all of
which provide different useful functionality. However, such sen-
sors can also provide side-channels that can be exploited by an ad-
versary to uniquely fingerprint smartphones. Recent studies have
looked at exploiting microphones and speakers to fingerprint smart-
phones [25, 27, 55]. Others have looked at utilizing motion sensors
like accelerometer to uniquely distinguish smartphones [25, 31].
And most recently, Das et al. have shown that they can improve
the fingerprinting accuracy by combining gyroscope with inaudi-
ble sound [29]. Our approach builds on the work done by Das et
al. However, our work provides a real-world perspective on the
problem. We not only show that sensor-based fingerprinting works
at large scale but also show how websites are accessing the sensor
data in the wild. Moreover, we also provide a new countermeasure
technique where we quantize sensor data to lower the resolution of
the sensor. We also by perform a large scale user study to where
users play a online game to show that our countermeasure does not
affect the utility of the sensors.
3. FEATURES AND EVALUATION METRICS
In this section we briefly describe the data collection and data
preprocessing step. We also discuss the classification algorithms
and evaluation metrics used in our evaluation.
3.1 Data Collection
To collect sensor data from smartphones we develop a web page1.
The web page contains a JavaScript to access motion sensors like
accelerometer and gyroscope. We create an event listener for de-
vice motion in the following manner:
1http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/MTurkExp.html. We obtain IRB
approval for collecting sensor data.
window.addEventListener(‘devicemotion’,motionHandler)
Once the event listener is registered, the motionHandler func-
tion can access accelerometer and gyroscope data in the following
manner:
function motionHandler(event){
// Access Accelerometer Data
ax = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.x;
ay = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.y;
az = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.z;
// Access Gyroscope Data
rR = event.rotationRate;
if (rR != null){
gx = rR.alpha;
gy = rR.beta ;
gz = rR.gamma;
}
}
Users are asked to visit our web page while placing their smart-
phone on a flat surface. Thus, mimicking the scenario where the
user has placed his/her smartphone on a desk while browsing a
web page. Our web page collects 10 samples consecutively where
each sample is 5 seconds worth of sensor data (total participation
time is in the range of 1 minute). We found that popular mobile
web browsers such as Chrome, Safari and Opera all have a simi-
lar sampling rate in the range of 100-120 Hz (Firefox provided a
sampling rate close to 180 Hz)2. However, the sample rate avail-
able at any instance of time depends on multiple factors such as
the current battery life and the number of applications running in
the background. As a result we received data from participants at
various sampling rates ranging from 20 Hz to 120 Hz. Initially,
we recruited users through university mass email and social me-
dia like Facebook and Twitter. Later on, we recruited participants
through Amazon Mechanical Turk [2]. In total, we had a total of
610 participants over a period of three months. We obtained data
from 108 different brands (i.e., make and model) of smartphones
with different models of iPhone comprising nearly half of the total
devices3. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the different number
of samples per device. Since some participation was voluntary for
users not using Mechanical Turk, we see that many users provided
fewer than 10 samples.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the number of data samples per smartphone.
For the purpose of labeling our data we plant a unique random
number inside the cookie. This provides us with ground truth data,
2http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/SamplingFreq.html
3We used https://web.wurfl.io/#learnmore to obtain the make
and model of a smartphone.
thus, making it possible to correlate data samples coming from the
same physical device.4
3.2 Processed Data Streams
We process the accelerometer and gyroscope data into four time-
series data streams, similar to the way Das et al. do in their pa-
per [29]. At any given timestamp, t, we have the following two data
vectors: 1) acceleration including gravity, ~a(t) = (ax, ay, az) and
2) rotational rate, ~ω(t) = (ωx, ωy, ωz). The accelerometer value
includes gravity, i.e., whenever the device lies stationary flat on top
of a surface we get a value of 9.81ms−2 along the z-axis. To make
the fingerprint technique independent of device orientation we take
the magnitude of the acceleration vector, |~a(t)| =√a2x + a2y + a2z
as one of our processed data streams. For the gyroscope, since there
is no baseline rotational speed (i.e., irrespective of device orienta-
tion a stationary device should register 0 rads−1 rotation rate along
all three axes), we consider each axis as a separate source of data
stream. Thus, we end up with the following four streams of sensor
data: {|~a(t)|, ωx(t), ωy(t), ωz(t)}. To obtain frequency domain
characteristics we interpolate the non-equally spaced data stream
into equally-spaced time-series data by using cubic-spline interpo-
lation.
3.3 Features
Inspired by the most recent work in this field by Das et al. [29],
we extract the same set of 25 features from each data stream. We
obtain the feature extraction code base from Das et al [29]. Out of
these 25 features, 10 are temporal features and the remaining 15 are
spectral features5. As we have four data streams, we have a total of
100 features to summarize the unique characteristics of the motion
sensors.
3.4 Classification Algorithms and Metrics
Classification Algorithms: Following the approach of Das et al.,
we use a supervised multi-class classifier. For any supervised al-
gorithm we need to split our data set into training and testing set.
The training set (labeled with true device identity) is used to train
the classifier while the testing set is used to evaluate how well we
can classify unseen data points. In this paper we explore the perfor-
mance of the following two classifiers: k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN)
and Random Forest (MATLAB’s Treebagger model) [17]; the lat-
ter having been found by Das et al. to achieve the best classification
performance.
Evaluation metrics: For evaluation metric we use the well-known
classification metric F-score [50]. F-score is the harmonic mean of
precision and recall. To compute precision and recall we first com-
pute the true positive (TP ) rate for each class, i.e., the number of
traces that are correctly classified. Similarly, we compute the false
positive (FP ) and false negative (FN ) as the number of wrongly
accepted and wrongly rejected traces, respectively, for each class i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n). We then compute precision, recall, and F-score for
each class using the following equations:
Precision, Pri = TPi/(TPi + FPi) (1)
Recall, Rei = TPi/(TPi + FNi) (2)
F-Score, Fi = (2× Pri ×Rei)/(Pri +Rei) (3)
4It is possible that users cleared this cookie, but we do not ex-
pect this to happen with enough frequency to significantly affect
our data.
5A detailed description of each feature is available in the tech-
nical report provided by Das et al. [28]
To obtain the overall performance of the system we compute aver-
age values across all classes in the following way:
Avg. Precision, AvgPr =
∑n
i=1 Pri
n
(4)
Avg. Recall, AvgRe =
∑n
i=1Rei
n
(5)
Avg. F-Score, AvgF =
2×AvgPr ×AvgRe
AvgPr +AvgRe
(6)
To evaluate our large scale simulation results we use Accuracy as
our evaluation metric6. Accuracy is defined as the portion of test
traces that are correctly classified.
Accuracy, Acc =
# of samples correctly classified
Total test samples
(7)
4. FINGERPRINTING SMARTPHONES
In this section we will first look at how well we can fingerprint
our participating smartphones. Next, we will discuss how we can
expand our results to simulate experiments with large number of
smartphones. Finally, we will provide simulation results for large
number of smartphones.
4.1 Results From Participating Smartphones
We had a total of 610 participants in our data collection study. To
evaluate the performance of the classifiers, we first split our data set
in training and testing set. As we have devices with different num-
ber of data samples (see figure 1), we evaluate F-score for different
size of training set. We randomly choose the training and testing
samples. To prevent any bias in the selection of the training and
testing set we rerun our experiments 10 times and report the aver-
age F-score 7. Table 1 summarizes the average F-score for different
number of training samples per device.
Table 1: Average F-score for different training set size
Training Number Avg. F-score (%)
samples of Random
per device devices Foresta
1 586 33
2 567 65
3 545 78
4 524 83
5 501 86
6 483 88
7 468 89
8 444 89
9 400 90
a100 bagged decision trees
From Table 1 we see that we can achieve high classification ac-
curacy even for this larger data set. With five training samples,
which correspond to about 25 s of data, accuracy is 86%, increas-
ing to 90% with 9 training samples. Even with a single 5 s sample,
we obtain 33% accuracy, which may be sufficient if a small amount
of extra information can be obtained through other browser finger-
printing techniques, however weak.
In terms of performance, we found that on average it takes around
100–200 ms to match a new fingerprint to an existing fingerprint.
For our experiments we use a desktop machine with an Intel i7-
2600 3.4GHz processor with 12GiB RAM.
6Accuracy can be thought of as a relaxed version of F-score.
7We also compute the 95% confidence interval for F-score, but
we found it to be less than 1% in most cases.
4.2 Analyzing Scalability
Although we have shown that we can reliably fingerprinting a
few hundred devices, in real-world scenarios the fingerprinted pop-
ulation will be much larger. It is not feasible for us to collect data
on much larger data sets; instead, we develop a model to predict
how well a classifier will perform as the number of devices grows.
However, although random forest provides the best classification
performance, on our data set, its operation is hard to model, as
different trees use a different random sample of features. We there-
fore base our analysis on nearest-neighbor classifier (k-NN), which
uses a distance metric that we can model parametrically. Note that
k-NN does not perform as well as random forest; as a result, our
estimates are a conservative measure of the actual attainable clas-
sification accuracy.
4.2.1 Distance Metric Learning
The k-NN algorithm relies on a distance metric to identify neigh-
boring points. It is possible to compute simple Euclidean distance
between feature vectors; however, this is unlikely to yield optimal
results as some features will tend to dominate. Learning a bet-
ter distance (or similarity) metric between data points has received
much attention in the field of machine learning, pattern recognition
and data mining for the past decade [24]. Handcrafting a good dis-
tance metric for a specific problem is generally difficult and this
has led to the emergence of metric learning. The goal of a distance
metric learning algorithm is to take advantage of prior informa-
tion, in form of labels, to automatically learn a transformation for
the input feature space. A particular class of distance function that
exhibits good generalization performance for distance-based clas-
sifiers such as k-NN, is Mahalanobis metric learning [37]. The aim
is to find a global, linear transformation of the feature space such
that relevant dimensions are emphasized while irrelevant ones are
discarded. The linear transformation performs arbitrary rotations
and scalings to conform to the desired geometry. After projection,
Euclidean distance between data points is measured.
State-of-the-art Mahalanobis metric learning algorithms include
Large Margin Nearest Neighbor (LMNN) [53], Information Theo-
retic Metric Learning (ITML) [30] and Logistic Discriminant Met-
ric Learning (LDML) [34]. A brief description of these metric
learning algorithms is provided by Köstinger et al. [37]. To un-
derstand how these metric learning algorithms improve the perfor-
mance k-NN classifier, we first plot the mutual information (MI) of
each feature before and after each transformation. Figure 2 shows
the amount of mutual information per feature under both untrans-
formed and transformed settings.
Table 2: Performance of different metric learning algorithms
Avg. F-score for k-NNa
Untransformed LMNN ITML LDML
35 41 46 50
a
k = 1, 3 training samples per device
Figure 2 shows a clear benefit of the distance metric learning
algorithms. All of the transformations provide higher degree of
mutual information compared to the original untransformed data.
Among the three transformations we see that LDML on average
provides slightly higher amount mutual information per feature.
This is confirmed when we rerun the k-NN classifier on the trans-
formed feature space. Table 2 highlights the average F-score for
different metric learning algorithms. We see that for our data set,
LDML seems to be the best choice. We, therefore, use LDML al-
gorithm to transform our feature space before applying k-NN for
the rest of the paper. However, even with LDML, k-NN underper-
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Figure 2: Comparing mutual information for different metric learning algorithms. Mutual information per feature for (a) untransformed data (b) LMNN
transformation (c) ITML transformation, and (d) LDML transformation.
forms random forest, as seen in Table 3: our F -score drops from
78% to 54% with 3 samples and from 86% to 64% with 5 samples.
Table 3: Average F-score of k-NN after LDML
Training Number Avg. F-score (%)
samples of k-NN
a
k-NN+LDML
b Random
per device devices Forestc
1 586 24 38 33
2 567 31 43 65
3 545 35 50 78
4 524 36 52 83
5 501 38 54 86
6 483 38 54 88
7 468 38 53 89
8 444 37 52 89
9 400 35 50 90
a
k = 1
b
k = 1
c100 bagged decision trees
4.2.2 Intra and Inter-Device Distance
To predict how k-NN will operate on larger data sets, we proceed
to derive a distribution for distances between samples from differ-
ent devices (inter-device), and a second distribution for distances
between different samples from the same device (intra-device), af-
ter first applying the LDML transformation to the feature space.
Since each data sample is a point in a n-dimensional feature space,
we compute the Euclidean distance between any two data samples
using the the following equation:
d(p, q) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(pi − qi)2 (8)
where p and q represent two feature vectors defined as follows,
p = (p1, p2, ..., pn), q = (q1, q2, ..., qn). We then group distances
between feature vectors from the same device into one classCintra
and distances between feature vectors from different devices into
another class Cinter . Class Cintra and Cinter can be defined as
follows:
Cintra = {x : x = d(p, q), p ∈ Di, q ∈ Di, ∀i ∈ D}
Cinter = {x : x = d(p, q), p ∈ Di, q ∈ Dj , i 6= j, ∀i, j ∈ D}
where D refers to the set of all devices (we consider only devices
with at least 2 traing samples, we have 567 such devices). We can
now fit an individual distribution for each class. To do this we
utilize MATLAB’s fitdist function [7]. To avoid overfitting, we dis-
tribute our devices into four equal subsets. We then fit and com-
pare distributions from each subset. Figure 3 shows the top five
estimated inter-device distance (Cinter) distributions for each sub-
set of devices. Here, the distributions are ranked based on Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) [23]. From figure 3 we can see that
the top five distributions are more or less consistent across all four
subsets.
Next, we plot the same inter-device distance distribution but this
time we consider data from all 567 devices. Figure 4(a) highlights
the top five distributions. Comparing figure 3 and figure 4(a), we
see that the most representative inter-device distance distribution is
an Inverse Gaussian distribution. Similarly, we find that the most
likely intra-device distance distribution (Cintra) is a Generalized
extreme value distribution as shown in figure 4(b). Figure 4(c)
shows the difference between intra and inter-device distance dis-
tribution.
4.2.3 Simulating A Large Number Of Smartphones
Now that we have representative distributions for intra and inter-
device distances, we can simulate a k-NN classifier. The pseudo
code for simulating k-NN classifier is provided in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm works as follows. Let us assume that there are D
devices and for each device we have N training samples. Now,
for any given test sample, a k-NN classifier, first computes N×D
distances of which N distances are with samples from the same
device and N×(D − 1) distances are with all samples belonging
to (D − 1) other devices. We emulate these distances by draw-
ing N and N×(D − 1) distances from our representative intra
and inter-device distance distributions, respectively. k-NN classi-
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Figure 3: Estimated inter-device distance distributions for 4 subsets of devices where each subset contains 141 devices.
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Figure 4: Estimated distributions for (a) inter-device distance (Cinter) (b) intra-device distance (Cintra). (c) Difference between intra and inter-device
distance distribution.
Algorithm 1 Simulating k-NN classifier
Input: k, N , D, Distrintra, Distrinter , Runs
k – number of nearest neighbors (odd integer)
N – number of training samples per device
D – number of devices
Distrintra – intra-device distance distribution
Distrinter – inter-device distance distribution
Runs – number of runs
Output: Acc
Acc – Average classification accuracy
d← {} #list of (distance,label) tuple
Acc← 0
for i := 1 to Runs do
#add N intra-distances and label each with 0
for j := 1 to N do
d← d+ {(random(Distrintra), 0)}
end for
#add N×(D − 1) inter-distances and label each with 1
for j := 1 to N×(D − 1) do
d← d+ {(random(Distrinter), 1)}
end for
d← sort(d) #in ascending order of distance
l← label(d, k) #return label for top k elements
imposters← sum(l) #sum top k labels
if imposters < k/2 then
Acc← Acc+ 1 #correct decision
end if
end for
Acc← Acc/Runs
return Acc
fier then inspects the class label for the k nearest neighbors. We can
emulate this step by sorting the distances and picking the k lowest
distances. Lastly, k-NN classifier outputs the class label with the
majority vote. To emulate this step we assign each distance a label
of either 0 (meaning distance from same device) or 1 (meaning dis-
tance from different device). We then check if label-0 dominates
over label-1, if so we count that as a successful classification. This
whole process repeats multiple times to provide us with an average
classification accuracy.
Next, we run our k-NN simulator for large number of devices.
Figure 5 shows the average classification accuracy achieved for dif-
ferent values of N and k. Given that a user spends on average
anywhere between 15 to 20 seconds on a web page [8, 19] val-
ues of N ≤ 5 seem most realistic (each of our data sample is 5
seconds worth of web session). We also experimented with other
values of k, but found that setting k = 1 provides the best over-
lap between real-world and simulation results.8 From figure 5 we
see that our simulation results closely match our real-world results.
Also we can see that the average classification accuracy is in the
range of 12-16% when we scale up to 100 000 devices. This ac-
curacy is unlikely to be sufficient if motion sensors are the unique
source of a fingerprint, but it suggests that combining motion sen-
sor data with even a weak browser-based fingerprint is likely to
be effective at distinguishing users in large populations. Addition-
ally, these classification accuracies are conservative and potentially
provide a lower bound on performance, as random forests provide
significantly better performance.
5. WEBSITES ACCESSING SENSORS
In this section we look at how many of the top websites access
motion sensors. We also try to cluster the access patterns into broad
use cases.
5.1 Methodology
Figure 6 provides an overview of our methodology to automat-
ically capture and cluster JavaScripts accessing sensor data from
mobile browsers. To automate this process, we use Selenium Web
Driver [15] to run an instance of Chrome browser with a user agent
set for a smartphone client. In order to collect unfolded JavaScripts,
we attach a debugger between the V8 JavaScript engine [12] and
the web page. Specifically, we observe script.parsed func-
tion, which is invoked when new code is added with <iframe> or
<script> tag. We implement the debugger as a Chrome exten-
sion and monitor all JavaScript snippets parsed on a web page. The
debugger collects script snippets that access sensor data, i.e., scripts
that invoke sensor APIs. Once scripts are collected, we aim to clus-
ter them into a broad groups to identify their usage pattern. To an-
alyze and quantify the similarity between JavaScript snippets, we
parse them to produce Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs). ASTs have
been used in prior literatures for JavaScript malware detection [26].
ASTs allow us to retain the structural and logical properties of the
code while ignoring fine details like variable names, which are not
8Differences between our k-NN model and the actual k-NN
classifier on real data arise from an imperfect fit of the distribu-
tion as well as the fact that our model makes an assumption that
intra- and inter-phone distances are identically and independently
distributed.
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Figure 5: Comparison between real-world and simulation .Simulation results closely match real-world results. Even with 100K devices we can
AST Parser 
(example: var answer = 6 *  7;)
ExpressionStatement
AssignmentExpression
'='
Identifier
'answer'
BinaryExpression
'* '
Literal
'6'
Literal
'7'
Feature Set
ExpressionStatement:1
AssignmentExpression:1
Identifier:1
BinaryExpressionLiteral:1
Literal:2
?
Script Checker
Cluster features
Script Snippet
Selenium Web Driver Chrome Browser
Chrome V8 engine
Java Script
Figure 6: Overview of our JavaScript analysis setup.
useful for our analysis. We use the Esprima JavaScript parser [6]
to visualize AST for each JavaScript snippet. We transform ASTs
into normalized node sequences by performing pre-order traversal
on each tree. It should be mentioned that we start parsing each
AST from the point where sensor data is first accessed. Each vari-
able length sequence is composed of node types that appear in the
tree. Since there are 88 distinct node types in JavaScript language,
we transform the variable length normalized node sequences into
88-dimensional summary vectors. In other words, each JavaScript
snippet is represented as a point in a 88-dimensional space, where
each dimension corresponds to a node type. Finally, we attempt to
perform unsupervised clustering on these summary vectors.
5.2 Our Findings
We run our experiment for the top 100 000 Alexa websites [5].
Among these websites we find that 1130 websites contain some
form of JavaScript code that accesses at least one of the motion
sensors. It is worth mentioning that a few of the scripts were down-
loaded from ad networks as the web pages were loaded. Table 4
shows a breakdown of the detected websites into their correspond-
ing ranking groups. We see that majority (1022 out of the 1130) of
our detected websites come from the top 10 000–100 000 websites.
However, even 6 of the top 100 websites seems to access motion
sensors.
Table 4: Top websites accessing motion sensors
Rank # of sites
1–100 6
101–1000 12
1001–10000 90
10001–100000 1022
Our next goal is to cluster these 1130 websites into individual
groups based on their usage of sensor data, so that we can identify
the major reasons as to why websites access motion sensors. To
cluster the JavaScript snippets into a small number of groups we
first perform feature reduction to remove irrelevant features. Many
of the 88 features had a value of zero for all Javascript snippets, so
we first throw out these features. This reduces the size of the fea-
ture vector to 31. We then use the MATLAB Toolbox provided by
Laurens van der Maaten [52] to further map the features into a low
dimensional space. We find that Stochastic Proximity Embedding
(SPE) method [22] provides the best outcome in terms of both re-
ducing dimensions and providing good clusters. Our final reduced
feature space had three dimensions. Figure 7 shows a scatter plot
along the three dimensions for all the JavaScripts. We can clearly
see that the JavaScripts form clusters. To determine the number of
clusters that is a good fit for our data we run k-means clustering
algorithm for different number of clusters and perform Silhouette
analysis [49]. Silhouette analysis can be used to study the separa-
tion distance between the resulting clusters. Silhouette coefficient
ranges from +1, indicating point are very distant from neighboring
clusters, through 0, indicating points are very close to the deci-
sion boundary between two neighboring clusters, to -1, indicating
points are probably assigned to the wrong cluster. Table 6 summa-
rizes the average silhouette coefficients (Csilhouette) for different
number of clusters. We see that silhouette coefficient peaks for 8
clusters. The corresponding silhouette plot for 8 clusters in given
in figure 8. We see that on average samples in cluster 1,2,4,6 and
7 have silhouette coefficient value greater than 0.6 while the sam-
ples in cluster 3,5 and 8 have silhouette coefficient close to 0.5. We
also see some samples with negative silhouette coefficients and this
is likely caused by JavaScripts coping code snippets belonging to
two different libraries. Here, our goal is not to generate a perfect
clustering of all the JavaScripts rather to broadly cluster them to
identify the major usage patterns for accessing motion sensors.
Table 6: Silhouette coefficient for different number of clusters
Clusters 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Csilhouette 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.38
Once we have the general clusters we then go back to the JavaScripts
to understand their usage for motion sensor data. This part of the
analysis was carried out manually. However, since we generated 8
clusters we sampled multiple JavaScripts from each cluster to ver-
ify if they were performing similar functionality with the sensor
data. We were able to identify 8 generic use cases for the motion
sensors.
Table 5 summarizes our findings. We see that majority of the
detected scripts periodically send sensor data to some third party
sites. We were not able to pinpoint the exact usage for sending
motion sensor data to third party sites as we did not have access
to third party code. The next big usage for motion sensor data is
that they are used in generating random numbers. Other uses cases
include parallax viewing, gesture detection, motion captcha, spe-
cific ad generation and orientation detection. We were not able to
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Figure 7: Scatter plot for Javascript snippets accessing motion sensors
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Figure 8: Silhouette plot for the estimated 8 clusters. Clusters 1,2,4,6 and
7 have silhouette coefficient value greater than 0.6.
concretely identify the use case for cluster 3 as we found that it
contains multiple scripts all performing different tasks; some were
doing touch analytics using accelerometer to detect tilt while oth-
ers were doing something similar to parallax scrolling. We intend
to perform a more thorough in-depth analysis of this usage patterns
in the future.
6. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section we look at the performance and usability of two
countermeasures against sensor-based smartphone fingerprinting.
We evaluate sensor obfuscation, one of the countermeasures pro-
posed by Das et al. [29]) and sensor quantization, a new approach
that we propose in this paper. We first look at their effectiveness
against sensor fingerprinting. Next, we look are how these coun-
termeasures impact the utility of the sensors by developing a web
based labyrinth game. .
6.1 Obfuscation Vs. Quantization
First, we will briefly describe the operations of the countermea-
sures. Intuitively, obfuscation tries to randomize the sensor finger-
print by scattering the fingerprint at different locations in the feature
space. On the other hand, quantization tries to group multiple fin-
gerprints into the same location and thereby making it hard for the
adversary to pinpoint the true device. The formal definition of the
two approaches is given below.
Obfuscation: Obfuscation technique adds small amount of noise
to the raw sensor values. The main idea is that since sensors them-
selves are not well calibrated, adding small noise to their raw value
is equivalent to switching to a different (mis)calibrated sensor. We
add obfuscation noise to the sensor data in the following man-
ner: sO = sM ∗ gO + oO , where gO and oO are the obfuscation
gain and offset, respectively. Based from the study conducted by
Das et al. [29], we set our offset and gain range to [-1.5,1.5] and
[0.75,1.25], respectively.
Quantization: The basic idea behind quantization is that human
brain cannot discriminate minute changes in angle or magnitude.
As a result if the raw values of a sensor are altered slightly, it
should not adversely impact the functionality of the sensor. We
perform quantization in the polar coordinate system as it is easy to
perceive. So, our first task is to covert the accelerometer data into
its equivalent polar vector form as shown below:
radius, r =
√
a2x + a2y + a2z
inclination, θ = cos−1
az
r
azimuth, ψ = tan−1
ay
ax
where< ax, ay, az > represent the accelerometer data in the Carte-
sian coordinate system. Since gyroscope provides rotational rate
in rads−1, we do not perform any conversion for gyroscope data.
Next we pass our sensor data through the following quantization
function:
function quatization(val,type,bin_size){
// val: raw sensor value
// type: data type (angle or magnitude)
// bin_size: quantization size
bin_num = floor(val/bin_size);
remainder = mod(val,bin_size);
if remainder >= binsize/2{
bin_num = bin_num +1;
}
return bin_num*bin_size;
}
For angle related data (θ,ψ and gyroscope data) we set binsize = 6
while for magnitude (i.e., radius) we set binsize = 1. In other
words, we place angles into 6 degree bins and for accelerometer
magnitude we map it to the nearest integer. Once performing quan-
tization on the accelerometer data, we remap it to Cartesian coor-
Table 5: Generic use cases for accessing motion sensor data
Cluster # % of scripts Use Case Comment
6 40.5 Transmit sensor data Periodically sends motion sensor data to third party sites (can be marked suspicious)
4 16.6 Random number generator Crypto libraries use sensor data to add entropy to random numbers [16]
8 9.7 Detect device orientation Detects device orientation periodically to readjust components in the website
5 8.9 Parallax scrolling/viewing Parallax Engine that reacts to the orientation of a smart device [13]
2 7.1 Gesture detections A jQuery plug-in for gesture events such as ‘pinch’, ‘rotate’, ‘swipe’, ‘tap’ and ‘shake’ [9]
1 7.0 Motion captcha A jQuery CAPTCHA plug-in based on the HTML5 Canvas element [11]
3 6.0 Miscellaneous We were not able to point the exact use case for this cluster.
7 4.2 Specific Ad generation Checks to see if accelerometer is present so that certain ad URLs can be requested
dinate system using the following equations: ax = r sin θ cosψ,
ay = r sin θ sinψ and az = r cos θ.
6.2 Effectiveness of Countermeasures
In this section we will look at how the countermeasures impact
the fingerprinting F-score. For this setup we run our fingerprinting
scheme under three setting: baseline, obfuscation and quantization.
For each setting we then evaluate F-score for both random forest
and k-NN (with LDML). Table 7 shows our results for devices with
at least 3 training samples (total 545 devices).
Table 7: Comparing obfuscation and quantization with baseline
Scheme Avg. F-score(%)k-NN with LDML Random Forest
Baseline 50 78
Quantization 17 32
Obfuscation 7 26
We can see that the countermeasure schemes significantly reduce
the F-score. Next we see how the countermeasure schemes react to
different numbers of devices. Figure 9 highlights our findings. We
see that irrespective of the device number the F-score reduces sig-
nificantly under both countermeasure schemes. Theses results indi-
cate that simple countermeasures can thwart device fingerprinting
significantly.
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Figure 9: Comparing countermeasure schemes against baseline.
6.3 User Study
The above countermeasures degrade the readings from the mo-
tion sensors and we wanted to better understand the impact of the
countermeasures on the utility of the sensors to web applications.
Of course, motion sensors have a wide range of uses, from sim-
ple orientation detection to activity classification, step counting,
and other health metrics. Many of these, however, are deployed
in application form, whereas we wanted to focus on the threat of
fingerprinting by web pages. We performed a survey of web pages
to identify how motions sensors are actually used. We found that
one of the most common application of motion sensors was to de-
tect orientation change in order to adjust page layout; such a drastic
change in the gravity vector will be minimally impacted by coun-
termeasures. We did, however, find several instances where web
pages used the motion sensors as a means of gesture recognition in
the form of tilt-based input controlling a video game.
To study the impact of countermeasures on the utility of such tilt-
based controls, we carried out a user study where participants were
asked to play a game using tilt control while we applied privacy
countermeasures to their motion sensor data. We then evaluated
the impact of the countermeasures through both objective metrics
of in-game performance, as well as subjective ratings given by the
participants. Our study was approved by our institutional research
board (IRB).
6.3.1 Study Design
After receiving some information about the study, our partici-
pants were invited to play a game using their personal smartphone
(Figure 10(a)). The objective of the game is to roll a ball to its des-
tination through a maze, while avoiding traps (hitting a trap restarts
the level from the beginning). The game had five levels, which the
participants played in order of increasing difficulty. Each level was
played three times with different privacy countermeasures applied:
baseline (no countermeasures), obfuscation, and quantization. The
order of countermeasure settings was randomized for each partic-
ipant and for each level, and not revealed to the participants. Af-
ter completing a level three times, the participants were asked to
rate each of the three settings in terms of difficulty of controlling
the game on a scale of 1 to 5. Participants also were invited to
provide free-form feedback (Figure 10(b)). Their ratings and feed-
back, along with the settings and metrics regarding the time spent
on each game, and the number of times the game was restarted due
to traps, were then sent to our server for analysis.
(a) Level 2 of the game (b) Feedback form
Figure 10: Game interface. The object is to roll the ball to the flag while
avoiding traps by tilting the smartphone. The user is then asked for feedback
about the relative difficulty of each level using different privacy settings.
After completing a level, a user is invited to play the next level.
Users were required to play levels in order of increasing difficulty,
but participants were allowed to replay previous levels. We identi-
fied such repeat plays by setting a cookie in a user’s browser and
discarded repeat plays in our analysis.
Table 8: Number of users that completed the first n levels recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and other means.
Levels MTurk non-MTurk Total
completed
1 0 26 26
1–2 1 14 15
1–3 0 34 34
1–4 91 67 158
1–5 107 63 170
Total 199 204 403
6.3.2 Study Results
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Figure 12: Reduced game durations and number of restarts, as each level is played three times. A large training effect is observed between the first and second
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Figure 13: Impact of privacy method on subjective and objective ratings, when considering second and third attempts only. Shown are the histogram of
subjective ratings and CDFs of game durations and number of restarts on level 3. No significant difference is observed in any of the metrics.
We recruited users through institutional mailing lists, social me-
dia, as well as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We collected data from
202 users via Mechanical Turk and 206 users that were recruited
through other means, for a total of 408 users; several users’ data
had to be discarded due to irregularities in data collection. Note
that not all users played through all five levels, as shown in Table 8.
Note that Mechanical Turk users had to complete five levels to re-
ceive their reward, but in some cases we were not able to receive
some of their data due to network congestion at our server.
We found that, when considering the entire data set, the choice of
privacy protection method did not significantly influence the sub-
jective ratings assigned to the level (χ2 test, p = 0.34) nor the
objective metrics of the game duration (pairwise t-tests, p = 0.10
and 0.75 comparing baseline to obfuscation and quantization, re-
spectively) or the number of restarts due to traps (pairwise t-tests,
p = 0.11 and 0.47). However, as expected, all difficulty metrics
were significantly impacted by which level the person was playing,
as shown in Figure 11.
Furthermore, we observed a significant training effect between
the first and second time a user played the level (each level is played
a total of 3 times using different privacy methods), as seen in Fig-
ure 12. Interestingly, this was not reflected in the subjective ratings
(as verified by a χ2 test for each level), suggesting that participants
corrected for the training effect during their reporting. There was
a smaller training effect between the second and third time a level
was played; the improved performance was statistically significant
only for durations of levels 4 and 5 and for the number of restarts
on level 5; which makes sense given the difficulty of these levels.
We therefore compared the difficulty of metrics for different pri-
vacy methods across only the second and third attempts at a level,
discarding the first attempt as training. For reasons of space, we
show the results for level 3 only in Figure 13. Results for other
levels are similar. Significance tests fail to detect any differences
between the difficulty metrics when privacy methods are applied on
any level.9
Limitations: Although the study failed to detect a significant im-
pact of privacy methods on utility, it does not definitively show
that no impact exists—failure to reject a null hypothesis does not
demonstrate that the null hypothesis is true. In particular, given the
large variance in game performance across users, as seen in, e.g.,
Figure 11, we would like to compare how different privacy meth-
ods change a single user’s performance; however, given the low
impact of privacy protection we have observed so far, we would
need to modify our study to reduce or eliminate the training effect.
Additionally, we tested our privacy methods in a short game, and
perhaps in games with a longer duration some effects would mate-
rialize. However, we feel our results are promising in showing that
users may not have to lose much utility to employ privacy protec-
tion methods.
7. CONCLUSION
We demonstrated that sensor fingerprinting is feasible on a much
larger scale than previously studied. We showed that 90% accuracy
can be achieved for up to 400 devices, and at least 12–16% accu-
racy can be realized with 100 000 devices, as predicted according
to our model. Our measurement study reveals that motion sensors
are already used by over 1% of the top 100 000 websites, and that
sensor data are often sent to servers, which could serve as a vehi-
cle for fingerprinting. Thus we can conclude that motion sensor
fingerprinting is a realistic threat to mobile users’ privacy.
We also evaluated the tradeoff between privacy and utility as
realized by two different fingerprinting mitigation strategies. Our
measurement study suggests that many applications of sensor data
are unlikely to be affected. Our user study shows that even for sen-
sitive applications that use motion sensors as control input, there
is no significant impact of privacy mitigation techniques on the us-
ability of motion sensors in this context, according to both subjec-
tive and objective metrics.
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